ight, and
England was wrong. Twice, as we shall see, Mr. Schreiner, on behalf of
the Cape Ministry, hastened to declare publicly that the proposals of
the Transvaal were all that was satisfactory, before he even knew what
those proposals were. The Cape nationalists represented themselves as
"mediators." They had as little intention of mediating between the
Pretoria Executive and the British Government as a barrister, heavily
feed and primed with his client's case, has of mediating between his
client and his client's opponent at the hearing of a case in court.

But the Bond was "loyal." The Bond members of the Cabinet--T. Nicholas
German Te Water, and Albertus Johannes Herholdt, no less than William
Philip Schreiner, John Xavier Merriman, Jacobus Wilhelmus Sauer, and
Richard Solomon--had sworn, upon taking office, "to be faithful and
bear true allegiance to Her Majesty."

[Sidenote: The Schreiner ministry.]

The situation in which Lord Milner now found himself was thus one of
so extraordinary a character that it would be difficult to find a
parallel to it in the annals of our colonial administration. As High
Commissioner, he had advocated in the most emphatic terms the exercise
of the authority of Great Britain, as paramount Power, in the
Transvaal. As Governor of the Cape Colony, he was bound to administer
the affairs of the Colony in accordance with the advice tendered by
his ministers. And the advice which ministers were pledged to give him
was the direct opposite of that which he himself, as High
Commissioner, had given to the Imperial Government. To dismiss his
ministers--the alternative to accepting this advice--would have been
an extreme measure, to be justified only upon clear evidence that they
had failed in the duty which they, no less than he himself, owed to
the Crown. Whether Mr. Schreiner's Cabinet did so fail is a matter
that the reader must determine for himself; possibly it would be
difficult to show that, collectively or individually, the Cape
ministers did anything more injurious to British interests than was
done by the Liberal Opposition--again collectively or individually--in
England. One thing is certain: the action of the Afrikander Cabinet,
whether within or beyond the letter of its allegiance, lessened--and
was intended to lessen--the force of an effort on the part of the
Imperial Government, which might otherwise have averted the necessity
for war.

And here certain questions which will ar