ate to let matters revert to the
condition in which they were before peace was concluded; in other
words, to recommence the war....

"I should like to have said a word about the dynamite monopoly,
but I fear I have already exhausted your patience. My sole object
in writing is to preserve the peace of South Africa. There are,
of course, many unreasonable demands; but the President's
position will be strengthened, and, at all events, his conscience
will be clear in case of war, if he has done everything that can
reasonably be expected from him. I feel sure that, having used
your influence to bring him and Sir Alfred together, you will
also do your best to make your efforts in favour of peace
successful. I feel sure also that Sir Alfred is anxious to make
his mission a success; but there can be no success unless the
arrangement arrived at is a permanent one, and not merely to tide
over immediate difficulties."

And again, in writing to his brother, Mr. Melius de Villiers, Chief
Justice of the Free State, at a later date (July 31st), he says, in
allusion to this same visit to Pretoria:

"From an intimate acquaintance with what was going on, I foresaw,
three months ago, that if President Krueger did not voluntarily
yield he would be made to do so, or else be prepared to meet the
whole power of England. I accordingly begged of Krueger's friends
to put the matter to him in this way: On the one side there is
war with England; on the other side there are concessions which
will avoid war or occupation of the country. Now, decide at once
how far you will ultimately go; adopt the English five years'
franchise; offer it voluntarily to the Uitlanders, make them your
friends, be a far-sighted statesman, and you will have a majority
of the Uitlanders with you when they become burghers. The answer
I got was: We have done too much already, and cannot do more. Yet
afterwards they did a great deal more. The same policy of doing
nothing except under pressure is still being pursued. The longer
the delay, the more they will have to yield."

[Sidenote: Afrikander advice.]

This was plain speaking and sound statesmanship. Nor was Mr.
Merriman's appeal, written almost concurrently (May 26th) with Sir
Henry's letter to President Steyn, any less emphatic. It was addressed
to Mr. Abraham Fischer