after Majuba, and after the Raid, we were going to commence
a struggle for equality--nothing more, and then not to get it, the
shame would be too grave for any great Power to support, or for those
who sympathised with us in South Africa to endure. We had raised the
British party in South Africa from the dust by the stand which we had
made against Dutch tyranny in the Transvaal. If we were going to
retreat from that position, the discredit of our action would compel
England to resign her claim to be paramount Power, and with the
resignation of that claim England's rights in South Africa would
inevitably shrink to the narrow limits of a naval base at Simon's
Town, and a sub-tropical plantation in Natal. What was fundamental was
not the possibility of war, but the impossibility of retreat.
[Sidenote: Retreat impossible.]
Lord Milner still thought it possible, though not probable, that, if
the British Government took a perfectly strong and unwavering line,
the Dutch would yield, not indeed everything, but something
substantial. He also foresaw that it was possible, perhaps probable,
that they would not yield, and that in this case a state of tension
would be created which must end in war. His position was, therefore,
definite and consistent from the first. As we are pursuing a policy
from which we cannot retreat--a policy that may lead to war--it is
wholly unjustifiable, he said, to remain unprepared, unarmed, without
a plan, as if war were quite out of the question. And so far from
thinking that the preparations which he urged upon the Imperial
Government, and more especially upon General Butler, would make war
more likely, he believed that they would make it less likely. But even
if they did lead the Dutch to fight, it was not war but "retreat" that
must be avoided at all costs.
CHAPTER V
PLAYING FOR TIME
On June 8th, 1899, Mr. Chamberlain declared in the House of Commons,
that with the failure of the Bloemfontein Conference, a "new
situation" had arisen. If the Imperial Government had translated this
remark into action, the South African War would have been less
disastrous, less protracted, and less costly. But the same order of
considerations which prevented the Salisbury Cabinet from recalling
General Butler in June, caused it to withhold its sanction from the
preparations advised by the Commander-in-Chief, Lord Wolseley. From
the political point of view it was held to be desirable that the
British
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