not
be unduly hurried. The Transvaal reply, which was delivered on the
15th, was a refusal to accept the Smuts-Greene arrangement, re-stated
by the British Government, as the basis of the franchise reform,
coupled with a charge of bad faith against Sir William Greene.

It was a cleverly composed document, which owed its diplomatic effect
in no small degree to Mr. Fischer, who had revised it. It was written
for publication, since, in Mr. Fischer's opinion, the time had come to
write despatches which would "justify the Republic in the eyes of the
world"; and with this end in view it contained the suggestion that the
British Government was bent upon worrying the Pretoria Executive into
war.

"This Government," it explains, "continues to cherish the hope
that Her Majesty's Government, on further consideration, will
feel itself free to abandon the idea of making the new proposals
more difficult for this Government, and imposing new conditions,
and will declare itself satisfied to abide by its own proposal
for a Joint Commission at first proposed by the Secretary of
State for the Colonies in the Imperial Parliament, and
subsequently proposed to this Government and accepted by
it."[139]

[Footnote 139: C. 9,530.]

[Sidenote: Reinforcements sanctioned.]

The British despatch of September 8th represented the united opinion
of the Cabinet Council which had met on that day to consider the South
African situation. In sending it, the Government also decided to raise
the strength of the Natal and Cape forces to the total of 22,000,
estimated by the War Office as sufficient for defensive purposes, by
the immediate addition of 10,000 men, of whom nearly 6,000 were to be
provided by the Indian Army.[140] The despatch itself, definite in
contents and resolute in tone, was the sort of communication which, in
Lord Milner's judgment, should have been forwarded to the Transvaal
Government after the failure of the Bloemfontein Conference; and the
additional troops now ordered out were nothing more than the
substantial reinforcements for which he had applied in June. The three
months' negotiations had led the Salisbury Cabinet to the precise
conclusion which Lord Milner had formed at Bloemfontein. The only hope
of a peaceable settlement lay in a definite demand, backed by
preparations for war. But to do this in June, and to do it in
September, were two very different things. Assuming