Government should have an absolutely good case as before the
world--a case which would not only ensure the whole-hearted support of
the great bulk of the nation, and the active sympathy of the over-sea
British communities; but one that would be so strong in justice as to
overcome, or at least mitigate, the natural repugnance with which
international opinion regards a great and powerful state that imposes
its will upon a small and weak people by force of arms. Above all, it
had become a cardinal principle in Mr. Chamberlain's South African
policy to refrain to the last moment from any step which would
necessarily close the door to a peaceful solution of the differences
which had arisen between the South African Republic and the Imperial
Government.
[Sidenote: Policy of Home Government.]
Influenced by these considerations, the Government refused to give
effect to the measures demanded by the military situation, as it
existed after the failure of the Bloemfontein Conference, except in so
far as these demands could be satisfied without prejudice to the
dominating political objects which it had in view. As to the nature of
these measures there could be no reasonable doubt. It was necessary to
raise the British forces in the Cape Colony and Natal to a point
sufficient for defensive purposes, and to prepare an additional
force--an army corps--for any offensive movement against one or both
of the Republics. And as 6,000 miles of sea separated the seat of war
from the chief base of the army, the United Kingdom, it was obvious
that the defensive force should be despatched at once, and the
offensive force prepared no less speedily, in order that it might be
held in readiness to embark at the earliest moment that its services
were required.
To Lord Milner's reiterated warnings of the last two years, there was
now added the definite advice of Lord Wolseley and the Department of
Military Intelligence. In a memorandum dated June 8th, 1899,[82] and
addressed to the Secretary of State for War, the Commander-in-Chief
advised the mobilisation in England of a force consisting of one
complete army corps, one cavalry division, one battalion mounted
infantry, and four infantry battalions for lines of communication; the
collection of transport in South Africa; and the immediate initiation
of all subsidiary arrangements necessary for conveying these
additional troops and their equipment to the seat of war. This advice
was disregarded; b
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