uestion of being obliged to have recourse to
interference of such a nature."[91]
[Footnote 91: _Ibid._]
[Sidenote: Mr. Chamberlain's speech.]
This was admirable backing, and precisely what Lord Milner required to
aid him in his two-fold task of bringing both the Cape Ministry and
the Pretoria Executive to a more reasonable frame of mind. But Mr.
Chamberlain's next step was one of questionable utility.
In his speech at Birmingham (June 26th), after reviewing the relations
of Great Britain with the Transvaal Boers during the last twenty
years, Mr. Chamberlain declared that the Imperial Government, although
deeply anxious not to use force, must somehow see that things were put
right in South Africa.
"We have tried waiting, patience, and trusting to promises which
are never kept," he said; "we can wait no more. It is our duty,
not only to the Uitlanders, but to the English throughout South
Africa, to the native races, and to our own prestige in that part
of the world, and in the world at large, to insist that the
Transvaal falls into line with the other states in South Africa,
and no longer menaces the peace and prosperity of the whole."
This was the kind of speech which would have been suitable and
effective, if the South African garrison had been 20,000 instead of
10,000 strong, and the expeditionary force had been mobilised on
Salisbury Plain. It was unsuitable and ineffective under the existing
circumstances; when, that is to say, the British Government, by
refusing to sanction the measures advised by the Commander-in-Chief,
had elected to put themselves at a military disadvantage for the sake
of prolonging the stage of friendly discussion and in the hope of
gaining their point by diplomatic means. In these circumstances such
speeches were merely food for President Krueger to use in feeding the
enthusiasm of his burghers. What Lord Milner desired of the Home
Government was, as we have seen, a polite but inflexible demand for
the Bloemfontein minimum, coupled with unostentatious, but effective,
military preparations. The Home Government, as the sequel will show,
were driven by the unpatriotic attitude of the Liberal Opposition into
a precisely opposite course in both these respects. Their demand was
vague in substance, and irritating in manner; while their inadequate
defensive preparations were more than neutralised by the loudness with
which, in deference to the v
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