is termed indifference does not exclude prevenient
inclinations and pleasures. It suffices therefore that there be no
metaphysical necessity in the action which is termed free, that is to say,
it suffices that a choice be made between several courses possible.

233. He goes on again in the said chapter 157, p. 893: 'If God is not
determined to create the world by a free motion of his goodness, but by the
interests of his glory, which he loves by necessity, and which is the only
thing he loves, for it is not different from his substance; and if the love
that he has for himself has compelled him to show forth his glory through
the most fitting means, and if the fall of man was this same means, it is
evident that this fall happened entirely by necessity and that the
obedience of Eve and Adam to God's commands was impossible.' Still the same
error. The love that God bears to himself is essential to him, but the love
for his glory, or the will to acquire his glory, is not so by any means:
the love he has for himself did not impel him by necessity to actions
without; they were free; and since there were possible plans whereby the
first parents should not sin, their sin was therefore not necessary.
Finally, I say in effect what M. Bayle acknowledges here, 'that God
resolved to create the world by a free motion of his goodness'; and I add
that this same motion prompted him to the best.

234. The same answer holds good against this statement of M. Bayle's (ch.
165, p. 1071): 'The means most appropriate for attaining an end is of
necessity one alone' (that is very well said, at least for the cases where
God has chosen). 'Therefore if God was prompted irresistibly to employ this
means, he employed it by necessity.' (He was certainly prompted thereto, he
was determined, or rather he determined himself thereto: but that which is
certain is not always necessary, or altogether irresistible; the thing
might have gone otherwise, but that did not happen, and with good reason.
God chose between different courses all possible: thus, metaphysically
speaking, he could have chosen or done what was not the best; but he could
not morally speaking have done so. Let us make use of a comparison [272]
from geometry. The best way from one point to another (leaving out of
account obstacles and other considerations accidental to the medium) is one
alone: it is that one which passes by the shortest line, which is the
straight line. Yet there are inn