ions of a man so gifted: they occur in Chapter 151 of his _Reply
to the Questions of a Provincial_ (vol. III, pp. 900, 901).
FIRST SYLLOGISM
'God can will nothing that is opposed to the necessary love which he has
for his wisdom.
'Now the salvation of all men is opposed to the necessary love which God
has for his wisdom.
'Therefore God cannot will the salvation of all men.'
The major is self-evident, for one can do nothing whereof the opposite is
necessary. But the minor cannot be accepted, for, albeit God loves his
wisdom of necessity, the actions whereto his wisdom prompts him cannot but
be free, and the objects whereto his wisdom does not prompt him do not
cease to be possible. Moreover, his wisdom has prompted him to will the
salvation of all men, but not by a consequent and decretory will. Yet this
consequent will, being only a result of free antecedent acts of will,
cannot fail to be free also.
SECOND SYLLOGISM
'The work most worthy of God's wisdom involves amongst other things the sin
of all men and the eternal damnation of the majority of men.
'Now God wills of necessity the work most worthy of his wisdom.
'He wills therefore of necessity the work that involves amongst other
things the sin of all men and the eternal damnation of the majority of
men.'
The major holds good, but the minor I deny. The decrees of God are always
free, even though God be always prompted thereto by reasons which lie in
the intention towards good: for to be morally compelled by wisdom, to be
bound by the consideration of good, is to be free; it is not compulsion in
the metaphysical sense. And metaphysical necessity alone, as I have
observed so many times, is opposed to freedom.
238. I shall not examine the syllogisms that M. Bayle urges in objection in
the following chapter (Ch. 152), against the system of the Supralapsarians,
and particularly against the oration made by Theodore de Beze at the [274]
Conference of Montbeliard in the year 1586. This conference also only
served to increase the acrimony of the parties. 'God created the World to
his glory: his glory is not known (according to Beze), if his mercy and his
justice are not declared; for this cause simply by his grace he decreed for
some men life eternal, and for others by a just judgement eternal
damnation. Mercy presupposes misery, justice presupposes guilt.' (He might
have added that misery also supposes guilt.) 'Nevertheless God being good,
indeed goo
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