made for them only, and that they hold of no account what is
separate from their person; whence they infer that when something
unpleasing to them occurs all goes ill in the universe.
263. M. Bayle says that this observation of Maimonides is not to the point,
because the question is whether among men evil exceeds good. But, upon
consideration of the Rabbi's words, I find that the question he formulates
is general, and that he wished to refute those who decide it on one
particular motive derived from the evils of the human race, as if all had
been made for man; and it seems as though the author whom he refutes spoke
also of good and evil in general. Maimonides is right in saying that if one
took into account the littleness of man in relation to the universe one
would comprehend clearly that the predominance of evil, even though it
prevailed among men, need not on that account occur among the angels, nor
among the heavenly bodies, nor among the elements and inanimate compounds,
nor among many kinds of animals. I have shown elsewhere that in supposing
that the number of the damned exceeds that of the saved (a supposition
which is nevertheless not altogether certain) one might admit that there is
more evil than good in respect of the human kind known to us. But I pointed
out that that neither precludes the existence of incomparably more good
than evil, both moral and physical, in rational creatures in general, nor
prevents the city of God, which contains all creatures, from being the most
perfect state. So also on consideration of the metaphysical good and evil
which is in all substances, whether endowed with or devoid of intelligence,
and which taken in such scope would include physical good and moral good,
one must say that the universe, such as it actually is, must be the best of
all systems.
[289]
264. Moreover, M. Bayle will not have it that our transgression should have
anything to do with the consideration of our sufferings. He is right when
it is simply a matter of appraising these sufferings; but the case is not
the same when one asks whether they should be ascribed to God, this indeed
being the principal cause of M. Bayle's difficulties when he places reason
or experience in opposition to religion. I know that he is wont to say that
it is of no avail to resort to our free will, since his objections tend
also to prove that the misuse of free wil
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