said in his
admirable _Tables of Practical Philosophy_ that the [Greek: proton
pseudos], the primary cause of errors in this book by Mr. Hobbes, was that
he took _statum legalem pro naturali_, that is to say that the corrupt
state served him as a gauge and rule, whereas it is the state most
befitting human nature which Aristotle had had in view. For according to
Aristotle, that is termed _natural_ which conforms most closely to the
perfection of the nature of the thing; but Mr. Hobbes applies the term
_natural state_ to that which has least art, perhaps not taking into
account that human nature in its perfection carries art with it. But the
question of name, that is to say, of what may be called natural, would not
be of great importance were it not that Aristotle and Hobbes fastened upon
it the notion of natural right, each one following his own signification. I
have said here already that I found in the book on the Falsity of human
Virtues the same defect as M. Descartes found in Mr. Hobbes's _De Cive_.
221. But even if we assume that vice exceeds virtue in the human kind, as
it is assumed the number of the damned exceeds that of the elect, it by no
means follows that vice and misery exceed virtue and happiness in the
universe: one should rather believe the opposite, because the City of God
must be the most perfect of all possible states, since it was formed and is
perpetually governed by the greatest and best of all Monarchs. This answer
confirms the observation I made earlier, when speaking of the conformity of
faith with reason, namely, that one of the greatest sources of fallacy[266]
in the objections is the confusion of the apparent with the real. And here
by the apparent I mean not simply such as would result from an exact
discussion of facts, but that which has been derived from the small extent
of our experiences. It would be senseless to try to bring up appearances so
imperfect, and having such slight foundation, in opposition to the proofs
of reason and the revelations of faith.
222. Finally, I have already observed that love of virtue and hatred of
vice, which tend in an undefined way to bring virtue into existence and to
prevent the existence of vice, are only antecedent acts of will, such as is
the will to bring about the happiness of all men and to save them from
misery. These acts of antecedent will make up only a portion of all the
antecedent will of God taken together, whose result forms the conseque
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