ble; to bring the
burden of war home to the mass of the population was difficult, and
to hold the country by force impracticable. Such were the
difficulties which the genius of Napoleon was powerless to overcome,
and Napoleon invaded Russia with half a million of seasoned soldiers.

And yet with an army of 75,000 volunteers, and without the least
preparation, the Federal Government was about to attempt an
enterprise of even greater magnitude. The Northern States were not
bent merely on invasion, but on re-conquest; not merely on defeating
the hostile armies, on occupying their capital, and exacting
contributions, but on forcing a proud people to surrender their most
cherished principles, to give up their own government, and to submit
themselves, for good and all, to what was practically a foreign yoke.
And this was not all. It has been well said by a soldier of Napoleon,
writing of the war in Spain, that neither the government nor the army
are the real bulwarks against foreign aggression, but the national
character. The downfall of Austria and of Prussia was practically
decided by the first great battle. The nations yielded without
further struggle. Strangers to freedom, crushed by military
absolutism, the prostration of each and all to an irresponsible
despot had paralysed individual energy. Spain, on the other hand,
without an army and without a ruler, but deriving new strength from
each successive defeat, first taught Napoleon that he was not
invincible. And the same spirit of liberty which inspired the people
of the Peninsula inspired, to an even higher degree, the people of
the Confederate States.

(MAP. THE UNITED STATES. 1861.)

The Northern States, moreover, were about to make a new departure in
war. The manhood of a country has often been called upon to defend
its borders; but never before had it been proposed to invade a vast
territory with a civilian army, composed, it is true, of the best
blood in the Republic, but without the least tincture of military
experience. Nor did the senior officers, professionals though they
were, appear more fitted for the enterprise than the men they led.
The command of a company or squadron against the redskins was hardly
an adequate probation for the command of an army,* or even a brigade,
of raw troops against a well-armed foe. (* Even after the Peninsular
War had enlarged the experience of the British army, Sir Charles
Napier declared that he knew but one general who cou