Manassas Junction--thirty miles south-west of
Washington and barring the road to Richmond--that all interest
centred during the first campaign. Here was posted the main army of
the Confederacy, 20,000 volunteers under General Beauregard, the
Manassas Gap Railway forming an easy means of communication with the
Army of the Shenandoah.
Johnston's force had been gradually increased to 10,000 officers and
men. But the general was by no means convinced of the desirability of
holding Harper's Ferry. The place itself was insignificant. It had
contained an arsenal, but this had been burnt by the Federals when
they evacuated the post; and it was absolutely untenable against
attack. To the east runs the Shenandoah; and immediately above the
river stands a spur of the Blue Ridge, the Loudoun Heights,
completely commanding the little town. Beyond the Potomac is a crest
of equal altitude, covered with forest trees and undergrowth, and
bearing the name of the Maryland Heights.
Jackson, without waiting for instructions, had taken on himself to
hold and fortify the Maryland Heights. "I am of opinion," he had
written to General Lee, "that this place should be defended with the
spirit which actuated the defenders of Thermopylae, and if left to
myself such is my determination. The fall of this place would, I
fear, result in the loss of the north-western part of the State, and
who can estimate the moral power thus gained to the enemy and lost to
ourselves?"* (* O.R. volume 2 page 814.)
Lee, also, was averse to evacuation. Such a measure, he said, would
be depressing to the cause of the South, and would leave Maryland
isolated. The post, it was true, could be easily turned. By crossing
the Potomac, at Williamsport and Shepherdstown, twenty and ten miles
north-west respectively, the Federals would threaten the
communications of the garrison with Winchester; in case they were
attacked, the Confederates would have to fight with their backs to
the Shenandoah, broad, deep, and unbridged; and the ground westward
of Harper's Ferry was ill adapted for defence. Attack, in Lee's
opinion, would have been best met by a resolute offensive.* (* Ibid
pages 881, 889, 897, 898, 901, 923.) Johnston, however, believed his
troops unfitted for active manoeuvres, and he was permitted to choose
his own course. The incident is of small importance, but it serves to
show an identity of opinion between Lee and Jackson, and a regard for
the moral aspect of the
|