on, the Washington
column would remain within its intrenchments round the capital, and
the Confederates "would be put to the great disadvantage of achieving
nothing, and leaving the other points (Winchester and Staunton)
exposed." The concentration, therefore, was to be postponed until the
Washington column advanced.* (* O.R. volume 2 page 507.)

But by that time Patterson might be close to Winchester or
threatening the Manassas Railway. Johnston had thus a most delicate
task before him; and in view of the superior numbers which the
Federals could bring against Manassas, it was essential that not a
man should he wasted in minor enterprises. The defeat of Patterson,
even had it been practicable, would not have prevented the Washington
column from advancing; and every Confederate rifleman who fell in the
Valley would be one the less at Manassas.

July 15.

On July 15 Patterson left Martinsburg and moved in the direction of
Winchester. On the 16th he remained halted at Bunker's Hill, nine
miles north; and on the 17th, instead of continuing his advance,
moved to his left and occupied Charlestown. His indecision was
manifest. He, too, had no easy part to play. His instructions were to
hold Johnston in the Valley, while McDowell advanced against
Beauregard. But his instructions were either too definite or not
definite enough, and he himself was overcautious. He believed, and so
did General Scott, that Johnston might be retained at Winchester by
demonstrations--that is, by making a show of strength and by feigned
attacks. For more vigorous action Patterson was not in the least
inclined; and we can hardly wonder if he hesitated to trust his
ill-trained regiments to the confusion and chances of an attack. Even
in that day of raw soldiers and inexperienced leaders his troops had
an unenviable reputation. They had enlisted for three months, and
their term of service was nearly up. Their commander had no influence
with them; and, turning a deaf ear to his appeals, they stubbornly
refused to remain with the colours even for a few days over their
term of service. They were possibly disgusted with the treatment they
had received from the Government. The men had received no pay. Many
were without shoes, and others, according to their general, were
"without pants!" "They cannot march," he adds, "and, unless a
paymaster goes with them, they will be indecently clad and have just
cause of complaint."* (* O.R. volume 2 pages 169, 170.)