, forty-five miles north of Harper's Ferry.

These troops, however, though formidable in numbers, were as
ill-prepared for war as the Confederates, and no immediate movement
was to be anticipated. Not only had the Federal authorities to equip
and organise their levies, but the position of Washington was the
cause of much embarrassment. The District of Columbia--the sixty
square miles set apart for the seat of the Federal Government--lies
on the Potomac, fifty miles south-east of Harper's Ferry, wedged in
between Virginia on the one side and Maryland on the other.

The loyalty of Maryland to the Union was more than doubtful. As a
slave-holding State, her sympathies were strongly Southern; and it
was only her geographical situation, north of the Potomac, and with
no strong frontier to protect her from invasion, which had held her
back from joining the Confederacy. As only a single line of railway
connected Washington with the North, passing through Baltimore, the
chief city of Maryland, a very hot-bed of secession sentiment, the
attitude of the State was a matter of the utmost anxiety to the
Federal Government. An attempt to send troops through Baltimore to
Washington had provoked a popular commotion and some bloodshed. Stern
measures had been necessary to keep the railway open. Baltimore was
placed under martial law, and strongly garrisoned. But despite these
precautions, for some weeks the feeling in Maryland was so hostile to
the Union that it was not considered safe for the Northern troops to
cross her territory except in large numbers; and the concentration at
Washington of a force sufficient to defend it was thus attended with
much difficulty.

A single railroad, too, the Baltimore and Ohio, connected Washington
with the West. Crossing the Potomac at Harper's Ferry, and following
the course of the river, it ran for one hundred and twenty miles
within the confines of Virginia. Thus the district commanded by
Jackson embraced an artery of supply and communication which was of
great importance to the enemy. The natural course would have been to
destroy the line at once; but the susceptibilities of both Maryland
and West Virginia had to be considered. The stoppage of all traffic
on their main trade route would have done much to alienate the people
from the South, and there was still hope that Maryland might throw in
her lot with her seceded sisters.

The line was therefore left intact, and the company was permitted t