e Atlantic. And over
this vast expanse ran but six continuous lines of railway:--

FROM THE POTOMAC.

1. [Washington,] Richmond, Lynchburg, Chattanooga, Memphis, New
Orleans.

2. [Washington,] Richmond, Weldon, Greensboro, Columbia, Atlanta, New
Orleans.

(These connected Richmond with the Mississippi.)

FROM THE OHIO.

3. Cairo, Memphis, New Orleans.

4. Cairo, Corinth, Mobile.

5. Louisville, Nashville, Dalton, Atlanta, Mobile.

(These connected the Ohio with the Gulf of Mexico.)

6. Richmond, Wilmington, Charleston, Savannah.

(This connected Richmond with the ports on the Atlantic.)

Although in the Potomac and the Ohio the Federals possessed two
excellent bases of invasion, on which it was easy to accumulate both
men and supplies, the task before them, even had the regular army
been large and well equipped, would have been sufficiently
formidable. The city of Atlanta, which may be considered as the heart
of the Confederacy, was sixty days' march from the Potomac, the same
distance as Vienna from the English Channel, or Moscow from the
Niemen. New Orleans, the commercial metropolis, was thirty-six days'
march from the Ohio, the same distance as Berlin from the Moselle.
Thus space was all in favour of the South; even should the enemy
overrun her borders, her principal cities, few in number, were far
removed from the hostile bases, and the important railway junctions
were perfectly secure from sudden attack. And space, especially when
means of communication are scanty, and the country affords few
supplies, is the greatest of all obstacles. The hostile territory
must be subjugated piecemeal, state by state, province by province,
as was Asia by Alexander; and after each victory a new base of supply
must be provisioned and secured, no matter at what cost of time,
before a further advance can be attempted. Had Napoleon in the
campaign against Russia remained for the winter at Smolensko, and
firmly established himself in Poland, Moscow might have been captured
and held during the ensuing summer. But the occupation of Moscow
would not have ended the war. Russia in many respects was not unlike
the Confederacy. She had given no hostages to fortune in the shape of
rich commercial towns; she possessed no historic fortresses; and so
offered but few objectives to an invader. If defeated or retreating,
her armies could always find refuge in distant fastnesses. The
climate was severe; the internal trade inconsidera