uties, imposts, and excises shall be uniform throughout the
United States." That the second part of this grant gives a right to
appropriate the public money, and nothing more, is evident from the
following considerations: First. If the right of appropriation is not
given by this clause, it is not given at all, there being no other grant
in the Constitution which gives it directly or which has any bearing
on the subject, even by implication, except the two following: First,
the prohibition, which is contained in the eleventh of the enumerated
powers, not to appropriate money for the support of armies for a longer
term than two years; and, second, the declaration of the sixth member
or clause of the ninth section of the first article that no money shall
be drawn from the Treasury but in consequence of appropriations made by
law. Second. This part of the grant has none of the characteristics of
a distinct and original power. It is manifestly incidental to the great
objects of the first part of the grant, which authorizes Congress to lay
and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises, a power of vast extent,
not granted by the Confederation, the grant of which formed one of the
principal inducements to the adoption of this Constitution. If both
parts of the grant are taken together (as they must be, for the one
follows immediately after the other in the same sentence), it seems
to be impossible to give to the latter any other construction than
that contended for. Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes,
duties, imposts, and excises. For what purpose? To pay the debts and
provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United States,
an arrangement and phraseology which clearly show that the latter part
of the clause was intended to enumerate the purposes to which the money
thus raised might be appropriated. Third. If this is not the real object
and fair construction of the second part of this grant, it follows
either that it has no import or operation whatever or one of much
greater extent than the first part. This presumption is evidently
groundless in both instances. In the first because no part of the
Constitution can be considered useless; no sentence or clause in it
without a meaning. In the second because such a construction as made the
second part of the clause an original grant, embracing the same object
with the first, but with much greater power than it, would be in the
highest degree absurd. T
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