due regard to the interests of the people,
they likewise know which branch ought to be resorted to in the first
instance. From the commencement of the Government two branches of this
power, duties and imposts, have been in constant operation, the revenue
from which has supported the Government in its various branches and met
its other ordinary engagements. In great emergencies the other two,
taxes and excises, have likewise been resorted to, and neither was the
right or the policy ever called in question.

If we look to the second branch of this power, that which authorizes the
appropriation of the money thus raised, we find that it is not less
general and unqualified than the power to raise it. More comprehensive
terms than to "pay the debts and provide for the common defense and
general welfare" could not have been used. So intimately connected with
and dependent on each other are these two branches of power that had
either been limited the limitation would have had the like effect on
the other. Had the power to raise money been conditional or restricted
to special purposes, the appropriation must have corresponded with it,
for none but the money raised could be appropriated, nor could it be
appropriated to other purposes than those which were permitted. On the
other hand, if the right of appropriation had been restricted to certain
purposes, it would be useless and improper to raise more than would be
adequate to those purposes. It may fairly be inferred these restraints
or checks have been carefully and intentionally avoided. The power in
each branch is alike broad and unqualified, and each is drawn with
peculiar fitness to the other, the latter requiring terms of great
extent and force to accommodate the former, which have been adopted,
and both placed in the same clause and sentence.

Can it be presumed that all these circumstances were so nicely adjusted
by mere accident? Is it not more just to conclude that they were the
result of due deliberation and design? Had it been intended that
Congress should be restricted in the appropriation of the public money
to such expenditures as were authorized by a rigid construction of the
other specific grants, how easy would it have been to have provided for
it by a declaration to that effect. The omission of such declaration is
therefore an additional proof that it was not intended that the grant
should be so construed.

It was evidently impossible to have subjected this