Hence, too, the presumption
that it will be persevered in. It will surely be better to admit that
the construction given by these examples has been just arid proper than
to deny that construction and still to practice on it--to say one thing
and to do another.

Wherein consists the danger of giving a liberal construction to the
right of Congress to raise and appropriate the public money? It has
been shown that its obvious effect is to secure the rights of the
States from encroachment and greater harmony in the political movement
between the two governments, while it enlarges to a certain extent
in the most harmless way the useful agency of the General Government
for all the purposes of its institution. Is not the responsibility of
the representative to his constituent in every branch of the General
Government equally strong and as sensibly felt as in the State
governments, and is not the security against abuse as effectual in the
one as in the other government? The history of the General Government
in all its measures fully demonstrates that Congress will never venture
to impose unnecessary burdens on the people or any that can be avoided.
Duties and imposts have always been light, not greater, perhaps, than
would have been imposed for the encouragement of our manufactures had
there been no occasion for the revenue arising from them; and taxes and
excises have never been laid except in cases of necessity, and repealed
as soon as the necessity ceased. Under this mild process and the sale
of some hundreds of millions of acres of good land the Government will
be possessed of money, which may be applied with great advantage to
national purposes. Within the States only will it be applied, and,
of course, for their benefit, it not being presumable that such appeals
as were made to the benevolence of the country in the instances of
the inhabitants of St. Domingo and Caracas will often occur. How,
then, shall this revenue be applied? Should it be idle in the Treasury?
That our resources will be equal to such useful purposes I have no
doubt, especially if by completing our fortifications and raising and
maintaining our Navy at the point provided for immediately after the
war we sustain our present altitude and preserve by means thereof for
any length of time the peace of the Union.

When we hear charges raised against other governments of breaches
of their constitutions, or, rather, of their charters, we always
anticipate the