urposes
specified according to a proper construction of the terms. Hence it
follows that it is the first part of the clause only which gives a power
which affects in any manner the power remaining to the States, as the
power to raise money from the people, whether it be by taxes, duties,
imposts, or excises, though concurrent in the States as to taxes and
excises must necessarily do. But the use or application of the money
after it is raised is a power altogether of a different character.
It imposes no burden on the people, nor can it act on them in a sense
to take power from the States or in any sense in which power can be
controverted, or become a question between the two Governments. The
application of money raised under a lawful power is a right or grant
which may be abused. It may be applied partially among the States, or
to improper purposes in our foreign and domestic concerns; but still
it is a power not felt in the sense of other power, since the only
complaint which any State can make of such partiality and abuse is
that some other State or States have obtained greater benefit from the
application than by a just rule of apportionment they were entitled to.
The right of appropriation is therefore from its nature secondary and
incidental to the right of raising money, and it was proper to place
it in the same grant and same clause with that right. By rinding them,
then, in that order we see a new proof of the sense in which the grant
was made, corresponding with the view herein taken of it.

The last part of this grant, which provides that all duties, imposts,
and excises shall be uniform throughout the United States, furnishes
another strong proof that it was not intended that the second part
should constitute a distinct grant in the sense above stated, or
convey any other right than that of appropriation. This provision
operates exclusively on the power granted in the first part of the
clause. It recites three branches of that power--duties, imposts, and
excises--those only on which it could operate, the rule by which the
fourth--that is, taxes--should be laid being already provided for in
another part of the Constitution. The object of this provision is to
secure a just equality among the States in the exercise of that power
by Congress. By placing it after both the grants--that is, after that
to raise and that to appropriate the public money--and making it apply
to the first only it shows that it was not int