more by what I add. Such comparison is never a simple
matter, perhaps in any concrete case never wholly conclusive. But I
can conceive no more important and more clarifying declaration of
principle. It means that any rational decision as to the precedence of
social ideals, or as to historical progress from good to better, must
be based on width of representation and weight of incentive.

IV

If what I have said thus far has proved convincing to you, this may be
owing to the fact that you have not been called upon to adopt any
interest beyond what are conventionally regarded as your own. In moral
matters it is customary to attach a certain finality to personal
pronouns. But there are no terms in common use which have so rough and
loose a meaning, which cover so equivocal and confused an experience;
albeit the necessity and frequency of their use has made them standard
currency and polished them into a sort of deceptive smoothness to the
touch. There is no term so altogether handy as the term "I," nor is
there any so embarrassed when called on to show its credentials in the
shape of clear and verifiable experience. If, then, you stand upon
_your_ interests I shall not be convinced, for I shall {58} not know
what you mean. There is no sense in which you are a finished and
demonstrable fact. My dealings with you, and this is peculiarly true
of my rational dealings with you, cannot be tested by _you_ in any
absolute or fixed sense, simply because they may _make_ you, as they
may make me.

Let us return to our test case. You are the epicure, and I am the
proprietor; you seize my apple, and I protest. But now I no longer
appeal to you merely as one who enjoys eating apples, and warn you that
you are selecting the wrong means of attaining that end. I simply
inform you that the apple is my property, and that I desire to retain
it. I appeal to you to respect my wishes, at least to the extent of
non-interference. If you reply that this is no interest that you
acknowledge, then I am in a position to inform you. For on no ground
can you attach finality to the set of interests which at any given time
you choose to acknowledge. If I may remind you of a forgotten
interest, I may inform you of a new interest. In the one case, you
acknowledge that there is such an interest in that you anticipate its
revival, and realize that its mere absence is no proof of its
non-existence. You recognize it as having its roots in