Chesterton refers to one who "had that rational and deliberate
preference which will always to the end trouble the peace of the world,
the rational and deliberate preference for a short life and a merry
one." [7] I cannot regard such hedonistic opportunism as other than
wantonness or wilful carelessness. It may be deliberate in the sense
of being consciously persisted in, but I cannot find any rationality in
it. It arises naturally enough through the greater vividness of the
interests that are already adopted and proved; but all prejudices arise
from such accidents, and they are none the less on that account
absolutely antagonistic to the rational attitude--that willingness that
things should be for me even as they are.

In the second place, it has appeared that there is no demonstrable
priority of one simple interest over another differing only
qualitatively from it. I propose to call this the principle of _the
quantitative basis of preference_. I know that the term quantity has
an ugly sound in this context. {56} But I believe that this is due
simply to a false abstraction. Two good books are not better than one
because two is better than one, but because in two of a given unit of
goodness there is more of goodness than in one. Two is more than one,
but not more good, unless that which is counted is itself good. Nor is
two longer or heavier than one, unless the units numbered happen to be
those of length or weight. To prefer two interests to one does not
imply that one is a lover of quantity, but a lover of good; of that
which if it be and remain good, the more the better.

At any rate it seems to me a matter of simple candor to admit that
"more" is a term implying quantity, whether it be "more room," "more
weight," "more goodness," or "more beauty." It seems to me to be
equally evident that "more" implies commensurable magnitude; and that
commensurability implies the existence of a common unit in the terms
compared. Two inches are more than one inch in that they include one
inch and also another like unit. Now in moral matters the unit of
value is the fulfilment of the simple interest; and in consequence I
see no way of demonstrating that one such simple interest is more good
than another, as I see no way of demonstrating that one inch is longer
than another. But I do see that if I can carry a simple interest over
into a compound one, and there both {57} retain it and add to it, I
shall have more--