r nothing puts so great a strain on society as
progress. It tends to destroy its rigidity, to dull its edge, and to
spoil the fine adjustment without which so complex an organization
cannot function. There could be no human life whatsoever, and still
less a progressive life, were not the great mass of men content to
remain steadily in their places, and so form parts of a stable
structure. An organization cannot actually _work_ until it is in
equilibrium.

Now while the conservative fears to "swap horses while crossing the
stream," the radical reminds him that if he does not do so he will
never gain the farther shore. The conservative is satisfied to sit
firmly in the saddle, but the radical thinks only of the long distance
yet to go. There is a common misconception as to who is the real
radical, the real menace to this existing order. {146} He is not the
sceptic, but _the man with a purpose_; the man who believes in the
possibility of better things, and so has a motive impelling him to
abolish and reconstruct the present things. The sceptic, who holds all
order to be conventional and arbitrary, is as well satisfied with one
system as another. His natural course is a cynical acquiescence in the
inveterate folly of mankind. Or, finding order convenient, and fearing
that its true groundlessness will be exposed if it be made a matter for
discussion, he advocates blind obedience to the authority of the day.
Hence the disillusioned, especially if they occupy positions of power
in church or state or trade, may be counted on as the leaders of
conservative policy. The typical radical, on the other hand, is
Socrates, who censured the men of his time because they were satisfied
with something short of the best; and who was condemned because he
offered men _a good reason_ for reorganizing life.

The radical, like the conservative, is right. He is right, in the
first place, because he points out that the stability of the
established order is not proof of its finality. It may be, indeed
always will be, largely due to habit. Society forfeits a greater good
through mere inertia, through the tendency of any organization of
interests which runs smoothly and brings a steady return, to perpetuate
itself. The radical is the critic of {147} custom, condemning it for
timidly clinging to the present good, and abandoning the original
intent of life to attain to the maximum.

The radical is right, secondly, because he protests t