of this interest, and their place in life is determined by
it. To understand their importance and to estimate their moral value
it is therefore necessary to isolate this interest and examine it with
some care.[2]

By the aesthetic interest I mean to refer to the interest that is taken
in the work of fine art by the observer. There is undoubtedly a
special interest in creation, but it is of relatively small importance.
Even the artist is controlled largely by the interest in observing his
own work; and art is a serious social concern only because of its
appeal to the unlimited number of persons who may enjoy it without
having any hand in the making. Now, in the passing allusion which I
have made to the aesthetic interest, I have already used the term which
is most convenient for purposes of general definition. The aesthetic
interest is _the interest in apprehension_. What I mean by this will
become clear when I compare it with two other interests which may also
be taken in the content of experience. There is, in the first {180}
place, what is called the practical interest, that is, the interest in
an object on account of what can be done with it by manipulation or
combination with other objects. Secondly, there is the theoretical
interest in the structure of reality, manifesting itself in the
exploration of the object and its context. Now the interest in
apprehension is not an interest in what can be done with the object,
nor in its real structure, but in _the present conscious reaction to
it_. One may take all three of these interests in the same object.
Thus if I pluck the flower and take it home to my wife, I give evidence
of a practical interest in it; if I kneel down and examine it
carefully, I suggest the botanist; while if I continue to gaze at it
where it lies, it would appear that I enjoy simply looking at it. It
is this interest simply in looking at things, in just the perceiving,
feeling, thinking, or imagining them, that I mean to sum up as the
interest in apprehension, or the aesthetic interest. When objects
excite this interest, when, that is, any state or process of
consciousness of which they are the content tends to be prolonged for
its own sake, they are said to be beautiful. And objects which are
deliberately and artificially invested with a peculiar capacity to
excite this interest are works of fine art.

I shall not undertake to explain the interest in apprehension further
than to descr