erable respectively to _ethical_ and
_cosmological_ evidence. Since religion is a belief concerning the
overruling control of human interests, it involves on the one hand a
summing up of these interests, a conception of what the believer has at
stake, in short, an ethical judgment; and on the other hand, an
interpretation of the environment at large, in other words, a
cosmological judgment. Religion construes the practical situation in its
totality; which means that it generalizes concerning the content of
fortune, or the good, and the sources of fortune, or nature. Both
factors are invariably present, and no religion can escape criticism on
this twofold ground.

The ethical implications of religion are peculiarly far-reaching, since
they determine not only its conception of man, but also, in part, its
conception of God. This is due to the fact that {225} the term "God"
signifies not the environment in its inherent nature, but the environment
in its bearing on the worshipper's interests. It follows that whether
God be construed as favorable or hostile will depend upon the
worshipper's conception of these interests. Thus, for example, if
worldly success or long life be regarded as the values most eagerly to be
conserved, God must be feared as cruel or capricious; whereas, if the
lesson of discipline and humility be conceived as the highest good, it
may be reasonable to trust the providence of God without any change in
its manifestation.

Furthermore, as we shall shortly have occasion to remark, it is
characteristic of religion to insist, so far as possible, upon the
favorableness of the environment. But this favorableness must be
construed in terms of what are held to be man's highest interests.
Consequently, the disposition and motive of God always reflect human
purposes. This is the main source of the inevitable anthropomorphism of
religion.

Conceptions of nature, on the other hand, define the degree to which the
environment is morally determined, and the unity or plurality of its
causes. Animism, for example, reflects the general opinion that the
causes of natural events are wilful rather than mechanical. Such an
opinion obtained at the time when no sharp {226} distinction was made
between inorganic and organic phenomena, the action of the environment
being conceived as a play of impulses.

Religion is corrected, then, by light obtained from these sources: man's
knowledge of his highest interests, and