t come as the
natural sequel to a single-minded fidelity to these motives.
But even if it be true that moral standards are absolutely independent
of the standards proper {174} to art, it is not yet clear that the
moralist is justified in regarding his standards as more fundamental
than those of art. He may be politely but positively informed that he
is not to trespass. Now I feel that, after what has preceded, I am
fortified against the charge of impertinence. Art is subject to moral
criticism, because morality is nothing more nor less than the law which
determines the whole order of interests, within which art and every
other good thing is possible. It will scarcely be denied that art is
an expression of interest, that both its creation and its enjoyment are
activities, moods, or phases of life; and it follows that before this
specific interest can be safely or adequately satisfied, it is
necessary to fulfil the general conditions that underlie the
satisfaction of all interests. It is as absurd to speak of art for
art's sake as it is to speak of drinking for drinking's sake, if you
mean that this interest is entitled to entirely free play. Art, like
all other interests, can flourish only in a sound and whole society,
and the law of soundness and wholeness in life is morality.
The claim of art to exemption from moral criticism is commonly due to
one or both of these two forms of misapprehension.
In the first place, it is assumed that morality, too, is a special
interest; and that if the artist or connoisseur lets the moralist
alone, it is no more {175} than fair that the moralist should let him
alone.
But this assumption is false; as false as though the athlete were to
chafe at the warnings of his medical adviser on the ground that general
health was irrelevant to endurance or strength or agility. Now,
doubtless, an athlete may for a time neglect his general health with no
noticeable diminution of his skill; but that is only because he already
possesses the health to abuse. It still remains true that the
principles of health which the trainer represents are the principles
upon which his skill is fundamentally based. Nature has made him
healthy according to these principles, and he simply does not recognize
his debt to them. Similarly, art may flourish in spite of the neglect
of social and individual well-being, so that the pleadings of the moral
advocate seem irrelevant; but this is possible only becau
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