ts pertinence to life, and its incentive, from the great
manifold of particular interests which it conserves and fosters.

It is the formal rather than the material principle in life which
defines the direction of moral effort. By prudence, purpose, justice,
and good-will life is regenerated and urged, against the resistance of
inertia, towards its maximum of attainment. Hence these are the
virtues which make men heroes, and which are symbolized in manners and
in worship. Manners are a {122} symbolic representation of rational
intercourse; thus courtesy is a ceremony of respect, chivalry of
service, and modesty of self-restraint and impersonality. Worship is
similarly a symbolic representation of good-will and hope. Upon the
cultivation of "those outward and sensible motions which may express or
promote an invisible devotion" human life is dependent not only for its
graciousness, but for its discipline and growth.

{123}

CHAPTER IV

THE MORAL TEST OF PROGRESS

The phrase "philosophy of history" is at present somewhat in disrepute.
It enjoys much the same unpopularity among historians as does the term
"metaphysics" among scientists, and probably for the same reason. It
is assumed that such a discipline must either violate or exceed the
facts in the interests of some _a priori_ conception. Doubtless some
philosophies of history have been guilty of this charge; but they do
not, I am sure, exhaust the possibilities in the case. In the present
chapter I shall present an outline of what might fairly be regarded as
a philosophy of history, but which nevertheless does no more than
attempt a precise definition of principles which even the historian is
forced to employ.

I shall not attempt to define the task of history, except in the
broadest terms. The form which its results should finally assume is a
matter of dispute among historians themselves. But it is at least
possible to indicate the field of history in terms that will command
general assent. In the first place, history deals with change, with
the temporal sequence of events; and in the second place, it confines
itself to such events as belong to what is called human conduct.
Entirely apart from theories of method or technique, it seems clear
that any established fact falling within this description belongs
properly to that body of knowledge which we call history.

I wish especially to call attention to the fact that history deals with
_human c