oyous sense of bodily
well-being--comes only with exercises and restraints and fine living.[7]

The temperance praised by the Greeks is of like quality, with a further
reference to the reasonableness which it fosters. A prudence which is
mastered, which has become a spontaneity, delivers reason from bondage,
and makes the whole of life easily conformable to it. Thus
Castiglione, who is so often reminiscent of Plato and Aristotle, draws
a contrast between continence, as the "conquest" of prudence, and
temperance as its "beneficent rule."

Thus this virtue does not compel the mind, but infusing it by very
gentle means with a vehement belief that inclines it to righteousness,
renders it calm and full of rest, in all things equal and well
measured, and disposed on every side by a certain self-accord which
adorns it with a tranquillity so serene that it is never ruffled, and
becomes in all things very obedient to reason and ready to turn its
every act thereto and to follow wherever reason may wish to lead it,
without the least unwillingness.[8]

Such is that prudence which, though rich in its own right, is
nevertheless subordinate to greater good.

It is proper to regard prudence as inferior in principle to purpose and
good-will, or even as ignoble when confirmed in its narrowness. It
{91} denotes an organization of life in which as yet no interest has
risen above the rest; it bespeaks the common populace of interests,
disciplined, but not moved to any eminent achievement. The fact that
the validity of the principle of prudence is so readily granted is
significant of this. Prudence requires no interest to be other than
itself, but meets it on its own ground. There is no elevation of
motive.

But prudence is the first and most instructive lesson in morality. It
has a peculiar impressiveness, not only because it is so promptly and
unmistakably verified, but because it is so close to life. Its meaning
is unlikely to be obscured through being abstracted from the real
interests whose saving is the proof of its virtue. Furthermore,
although prudence is not the highest principle in life, it is a mistake
to suppose that it is therefore unnecessary in the highest spheres of
life. There is a problem of prudence that underlies every practical
problem whatsoever. If interests are to be organized they must be not
only subordinated but also co-ordinated, that is, adjusted within every
medium in which they meet. Wit