ther interests.
And this is true not only of such interests as may be assumed to exist,
as constitute one's present neighborhood, near and remote; it is also
true of interests that are as yet only potentialities, defined by the
capacity of living things {68} to grow. If it be unreasonable to
neglect the bearing of one's action on interests which one happens not
to be familiar with, it is unreasonable to neglect its bearing on
interests not yet asserted, wherever there is a presumption that such
may come to be. In other words, one's moral account cannot be made up
without a provision for entries that have yet to be made. Such a
provision will take the form of a purpose to grow, an ardent spirit of
liberality, an eagerness for novelty. Good-will builds better than it
knows; it is open toward the future; committed to a task which requires
foresight and also faith. But such devotion, with all its
extravagance, with its very reverence for what is not known but must
nevertheless be accounted best, is only, after all, the part of
fearless good sense. If anything be good, and if it be reasonable to
pursue it, then is the maximum of that thing the _best_, and the
pursuit of it _wholly_ reasonable.
It may even be said that thrift is only a lesser form of piety, and
piety the whole of thrift. For, first and last, goodness lies in the
saving and increase of life. The justification of any act lies in its
being provident; in its yield of immediate fulfilment and its generous
allowance for the other interest, the remote interest, and the interest
that is as yet only surmised. The good will is the will to participate
productively, permissively, {69} and formally in the total undertaking
of life. Only when this intention controls one's decisions can one act
without fear of one's own critical reflection.
VI
Let me add a word concerning the part played by the imagination in
enforcing the logic of morality. An enlightened conscience, or a
rational conviction of duty, will consist essentially in the viewing of
life with a certain remove from its local incidents. In conduct, as in
all matters where validity or truth is concerned, the critical
consciousness must disengage itself and view the course of things in
its due proportions, allowing one's dearest interests to lie where they
lie among the rest. I have read so admirable a representation of the
moral function of the logical imagination in a recent paper by H. G.
L
|