bias. The supposition is due to the confusion of a relativity in
the _subject-matter_ of the judgment, with a relativity of the judgment
itself to the individual that gives utterance to it. Thus the
judgment, "You like apples," deals with your interest and the objects
relating to it; but the judgment itself is not therefore biassed. It
is no more an expression of your opinion than it is of mine; it is a
formulation of what occurs in the field of experience open to all
observers. A judgment _concerning_ only you, is utterly different from
a judgment _representing_ only you. The latter, if there were such a
thing, would be ungrounded, and would justify the sceptic's suspicions.
The confusion is possible here simply because the subject-matter of the
judgment in question is itself a judgment. It could scarcely arise in
the parallel cases. The lever cannot be defined except in relation to
its fulcrum. This may be loosely generalized and made to read:
judgments concerning a lever are relative to a fulcrum. It might even
be said that a lever is a lever only from the point of view of its own
fulcrum. But the most unscrupulous quibbler would scarcely offer this
as evidence against {47} the objective validity of our knowledge of
levers. Your brother is necessarily related to you; but the
proposition defining the relationship is not on that account relative,
that is, peculiarly yours or any one else's. Fraternity is a complex
involving a personal connection, but is none the less entirely
objective. And precisely the same thing is true of goodness. To
observe it adequately one must bring into view that complex object
called an interest, which may be yours or his or mine; but it will be
brought none the less into our common view, and observed as any other
object may be observed. Because goodness is inherent in a process
involving instincts, desires, or persons, it is not one whit less valid
or objective than it would be if it involved the sun or the first law
of motion.

Let us now turn to a much more fruitful objection. Suppose it be
objected that your action, though good when thus artificially isolated,
will in the concrete case have to be considered more broadly before any
final judgment can be pronounced on it. To this objection I fully
assent. It implies that although we have fully defined a hypothetical
case of goodness, we have so far simplified the conditions as to make
our conclusions inadequate to moral e