ary here to determine.
That this should be generally supposed to be the case is mainly due, I
think, to a habit of associating pleasure peculiarly with certain
familiar and recurrent bodily interests. At any rate it is clear that
the pleasure which constantly _attends_ interests is not that _in which
the interest is taken_. Interests and desires are qualitatively
diverse, and to an extent that is unlimited. The simpler organisms are
not interested in pleasure, but in their individual preservation; while
man is interested not only in preservation, but in learning,
card-playing, loving, fighting, bargaining, and all the innumerable
activities that form part of the present complex of life.

Now, it is true that it is agreeable or pleasant to contemplate the
fulfilment of an interest; and that such anticipatory gratification in
some measure accompanies all endeavor. But there is an absolute
difference between such present pleasure and the prospect which evokes
it. And it is that prospect or imagined state of fulfilment which is
the object of endeavor, the good sought. It is also true that the
_fulfilment_ of every interest is pleasant. But this means only that
the interest is conscious of its fulfilment. In pleasure {18} and pain
life records its gains and losses, and is guided to enhance the one or
repair the other. Where in the scale of life pleasure and pain begin
it is not now possible to say, but it is certain that they are present
wherever interests engage in any sort of reciprocity. If one interest
is to control or engage another it must be aware of it, and alive to
its success or failure. Where life has reached the human stage of
complexity, in which interests supervene upon interests, in which every
interest is itself an object of interest, the consciousness of good and
evil assumes a constantly increasing importance. Life is more watchful
of itself, more keenly sensitive to the fortunes of all of its
constituent parts. It is proper, therefore, to associate pleasure with
goodness; and happiness, or a more constant and pervasive pleasure,
with the higher forms of moral goodness. But pleasure and happiness
are incidental to goodness; necessary, but not definitive of its
general form and structure.

In addition to goodness thus amplified there now enters into life at
the moral stage a new element of value, the _rightness_ or _virtue_ of
action which, though moved by some immediate desire, is at the same