artment of the West having devolved upon you,
I propose to offer you a few suggestions. Knowing how hazardous it is
to bind down a distant commander in the field to specific lines and
operations, as so much always depends on a knowledge of localities and
passing events, it is intended, therefore, to leave a considerable margin
for the exercise of your judgment and discretion.
The main rebel army (Price's) west of the Mississippi is believed to have
passed Dade County in full retreat upon northwestern Arkansas, leaving
Missouri almost freed from the enemy, excepting in the southeast of the
State. Assuming this basis of fact, it seems desirable, as you are not
likely to overtake Price, and are in danger of making too long a line from
your own base of supplies and reinforcements, that you should give up the
pursuit, halt your main army, divide it into two corps of observation, one
occupying Sedalia and the other Rolla, the present termini of railroads;
then recruit the condition of both corps by re-establishing and improving
their discipline and instructions, perfecting their clothing and
equipments, and providing less uncomfortable quarters. Of course, both
railroads must be guarded and kept open, judiciously employing just so
much force as is necessary for this. From these two points, Sedalia and
Rolla, and especially in judicious cooperation with Lane on the Kansas
border, it would be so easy to concentrate and repel any army of the enemy
returning on Missouri from the southwest, that it is not probable any such
attempt will be made before or during the approaching cold weather. Before
spring the people of Missouri will probably be in no favorable mood
to renew for next year the troubles which have so much afflicted and
impoverished them during this. If you adopt this line of policy, and if,
as I anticipate, you will see no enemy in great force approaching, you
will have a surplus of force which you can withdraw from these points and
direct to others as may be needed, the railroads furnishing ready means
of reinforcing these main points if occasion requires. Doubtless local
uprisings will for a time continue to occur, but these can be met by
detachments and local forces of our own, and will ere long tire out of
themselves.
While, as stated in the beginning of the letter, a large discretion must
be and is left with yourself, I feel sure that an indefinite pursuit of
Price or an attempt by this long and circuitous route
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