little.

I know nothing of General Buell's intended operations, never having
received any information in regard to the general plan of campaign. If
it be intended that his column shall move on Bowling Green while another
moves from Cairo or Paducah on Columbus or Camp Beauregard, it will be a
repetition of the same strategic error which produced the disaster of Bull
Run. To operate on exterior lines against an enemy occupying a central
position will fail, as it always has failed, in ninety-nine cases out of a
hundred. It is condemned by every military authority I have ever read.

General Buell's army and the forces at Paducah occupy precisely the same
position in relation to each other and to the enemy as did the armies of
McDowell and Patterson before the battle of Bull Run.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

H. W. HALLECK, Major-General

[Indorsement]

The within is a copy of a letter just received from General Halleck. It is
exceedingly discouraging. As everywhere else, nothing can be done.

A. LINCOLN.

TELEGRAM TO GOVERNOR ANDREW.

WASHINGTON, D. C., January 11, 1862

GOVERNOR JOHN A. ANDREW, Boston:

I will be greatly obliged if you will arrange; somehow with General Butler
to officer his two un-officered regiments.

A. LINCOLN

TO GENERAL D. C. BUELL.

EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, January 13, 1861

BRIGADIER-GENERAL BUELL.

MY DEAR SIR--Your despatch of yesterday is received, in which you say, "I
received your letter and General McClellan's, and will at once devote my
efforts to your views and his." In the midst of my many cares I have not
seen, nor asked to see, General McClellan's letter to you. For my own
views, I have not offered and do not now offer them as orders; and while I
am glad to have them respectfully considered, I would blame you to follow
them contrary to your own clear judgment, unless I should put them in the
form of orders. As to General McClellan's views, you understand your duty
in regard to them better than I do.

With this preliminary I state my general idea of this war to be, that
we have the greater numbers and the enemy has the greater facility of
concentrating forces upon points of collision; that we must fail unless we
can find some way of making our advantage an overmatch for his; and that
this can only be done by menacing him with superior forces at different
points at the same time, so that we can safely attack one or both if he
make