.

Yours truly,

A. LINCOLN.

PRESIDENT'S SPECIAL WAR ORDER NO. 1.

EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, January 31, 1862.

Ordered, That all the disposable force of the Army of the Potomac,
after providing safely for the defence of Washington, be formed into an
expedition for the immediate object of seizing and occupying a point upon
the railroad southwestward of what is known as Manassas Junction, all
details to be in the discretion of the commander-in-chief, and the
expedition to move before or on the 22d day of February next.

A. LINCOLN.

OPPOSITION TO McCLELLAN'S PLANS

TO GENERAL G. B. McCLELLAN,

EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, February 3, 1862.

MAJOR-GENERAL MCCLELLAN.

DEAR SIR--You and I have distinct and different plans for a movement
of the Army of the Potomac--yours to be down the Chesapeake, up the
Rappahannock to Urbana, and across land to the terminus of the railroad on
the York River; mine to move directly to a point on the railroad southwest
of Manassas.

If you will give me satisfactory answers to the following questions, I
shall gladly yield my plan to yours.

First. Does not your plan involve a greatly larger expenditure of time and
money than mine?

Second. Wherein is a victory more certain by your plan than mine?

Third. Wherein is a victory more valuable by your plan than mine?

Fourth. In fact, would it not be less valuable in this, that it would
break no great line of the enemy's communications, while mine would?

Fifth. In case of disaster, would not a retreat be more difficult by your
plan than mine?

Yours truly,

A. LINCOLN.

Memorandum accompanying Letter of President Lincoln to General McClellan,

dated February 3,1862.

First. Suppose the enemy should attack us in force before we reach the
Occoquan, what?

Second. Suppose the enemy in force shall dispute the crossing of the
Occoquan, what? In view of this, might it not be safest for us to cross
the Occoquan at Coichester, rather than at the village of Occoquan? This
would cost the enemy two miles of travel to meet us, but would, on the
contrary, leave us two miles farther from our ultimate destination.

Third. Suppose we reach Maple Valley without an attack, will we not be
attacked there in force by the enemy marching by the several roads from
Manassas; and if so, what?

TO WM. H. HERNDON.

EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, February 3, 1862.

DEAR WILLIAM:--Yours of January 30th