" for it came from a great man. I was not very much accustomed to
flattery, and it came the sweeter to me. I was rather like the Hoosier,
with the gingerbread, when he said he reckoned he loved it better than any
other man, and got less of it. As the Judge had so flattered me, I could
not make up my mind that he meant to deal unfairly with me; so I went to
work to show him that he misunderstood the whole scope of my speech, and
that I really never intended to set the people at war with one another. As
an illustration, the next time I met him, which was at Springfield, I used
this expression, that I claimed no right under the Constitution, nor had
I any inclination, to enter into the slave States and interfere with the
institutions of slavery. He says upon that: Lincoln will not enter into
the slave States, but will go to the banks of the Ohio, on this side,
and shoot over! He runs on, step by step, in the horse-chestnut style of
argument, until in the Springfield speech he says: "Unless he shall
be successful in firing his batteries until he shall have extinguished
slavery in all the States the Union shall be dissolved." Now, I don't
think that was exactly the way to treat "a kind, amiable, intelligent
gentleman." I know if I had asked the Judge to show when or where it was
I had said that, if I didn't succeed in firing into the slave States until
slavery should be extinguished, the Union should be dissolved, he could
not have shown it. I understand what he would do. He would say: I don't
mean to quote from you, but this was the result of what you say. But I
have the right to ask, and I do ask now, Did you not put it in such a form
that an ordinary reader or listener would take it as an expression from
me?

In a speech at Springfield, on the night of the 17th, I thought I might as
well attend to my own business a little, and I recalled his attention as
well as I could to this charge of conspiracy to nationalize slavery. I
called his attention to the fact that he had acknowledged in my hearing
twice that he had carefully read the speech, and, in the language of the
lawyers, as he had twice read the speech, and still had put in no plea
or answer, I took a default on him. I insisted that I had a right then
to renew that charge of conspiracy. Ten days afterward I met the Judge
at Clinton,--that is to say, I was on the ground, but not in the
discussion,--and heard him make a speech. Then he comes in with his plea
to this char