e question, and insisting that
Judge Trumbull had done something that I ought to say something about, and
finally getting out such statements as induce me to infer that he means
to be understood he will, in that supposed case, vote for the admission of
Kansas. I only bring this forward now for the purpose of saying that if he
chooses to put a different construction upon his answer, he may do it. But
if he does not, I shall from this time forward assume that he will vote
for the admission of Kansas in disregard of the English bill. He has the
right to remove any misunderstanding I may have. I only mention it now,
that I may hereafter assume this to be the true construction of his
answer, if he does not now choose to correct me.
The second interrogatory that I propounded to him was this:
"Question 2.--Can the people of a United States Territory, in any lawful
way, against the wish of any citizen of the United States, exclude slavery
from its limits prior to the formation of a State Constitution?"
To this Judge Douglas answered that they can lawfully exclude slavery from
the Territory prior to the formation of a constitution. He goes on to tell
us how it can be done. As I understand him, he holds that it can be done
by the Territorial Legislature refusing to make any enactments for
the protection of slavery in the Territory, and especially by adopting
unfriendly legislation to it. For the sake of clearness, I state it again:
that they can exclude slavery from the Territory, 1st, by withholding
what he assumes to be an indispensable assistance to it in the way of
legislation; and, 2d, by unfriendly legislation. If I rightly understand
him, I wish to ask your attention for a while to his position.
In the first place, the Supreme Court of the United States has decided
that any Congressional prohibition of slavery in the Territories is
unconstitutional; that they have reached this proposition as a conclusion
from their former proposition, that the Constitution of the United
States expressly recognizes property in slaves, and from that other
Constitutional provision, that no person shall be deprived of property
without due process of law. Hence they reach the conclusion that as the
Constitution of the United States expressly recognizes property in slaves,
and prohibits any person from being deprived of property without due
process of law, to pass an Act of Congress by which a man who owned a
slave on one side of a line wo
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