ea which had no just
foundation, namely, _the increase of the enemy's force at Cadiz_!
whereas, on the contrary, that force had not only been decreased by
the loss of two of its largest ships, but _all_ the rest had been so
materially damaged in the late actions as to be rendered for the
present unserviceable.

As might be expected, Sir James felt so indignant at this, to say the
least of it, ill-timed arrangement, that he considered it a duty he
owed to his character to express his feelings strongly in a respectful
answer to this communication, both to the Board, and to Earl St.
Vincent; which produced an explanation, in which it appeared that the
Admiralty, having determined to make Cadiz a separate command from
that of the Mediterranean, it became necessary to employ two
flag-officers. Sir James being the last on the list, none could be
found junior; and they were, therefore, under the necessity of
appointing a senior officer.

As it could not be disputed that the Admiralty had a right to make the
dispositions for which they alone were responsible, the correspondence
in which Sir James's services were acknowledged, and wherein regret
was expressed by their lordships at the necessity they had been under
of appointing a senior officer, ended in a satisfactory manner; and
Sir James was contented to remain as second in command under
Vice-admiral Pole, who arrived on the 31st August, in the St. George,
to assume the chief command of the squadron.

Two of the letters which Sir James received on this occasion have been
given in the preceding chapter, in order to show the reception which
the intelligence of his victory met with in England. The following are
copies of the official letters alluded to, and also of some private
letters, which express his feelings on the occasion.

Admiralty, 2nd August 1801.

SIR,

I received, yesterday, by Captain Ferris, and immediately
communicated to my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, your
letters of the 5th, 6th, 9th, and 10th instant, acquainting me,
for their lordships' information, that, having received
intelligence of three French line-of-battle ships and a frigate
having anchored off Algeziras, you had proceeded through the
Straits, with the squadron under your orders, for the purpose
of attacking them, which you had accordingly done on the
morning of the 6th; but that the Hannibal having unfortunately
taken the