ompatibility of the Goods of
individuals; so that each whilst pursuing exclusively his own Good,
may also believe that he is contributing to that of others. In reply,
it is suggested (1) that such a belief is not borne out by fact;
(2) that the belief does itself admit a Good common to all, namely,
society and its institutions.

In conclusion, it is urged that to disbelieve in a General Good is to
empty life of what constitutes, for most thinking men, its main value.

II. The position has now been taken up (1) that men who reflect do,
whatever may be their theoretical opinion, imply, in their actual
conduct, a belief in their ideas about Good, (2) but that there seems
to be no certainty that such ideas are true. This latter proposition
is distasteful to some of the party, who endeavour to maintain that
there really is no uncertainty as to what is good.

Thus it is argued:

(1) That the criterion of Good is a simple infallible instinct. To
which it is replied that there appear to be many such 'instincts'
conflicting among themselves.

(2) That the criterion of Good is the course of Nature; Good being
defined as the end to which Nature is tending. To which it is replied
that such a judgment is as _a priori_ and unbased as any other, and as
much open to dispute.

It is then urged that if we reject the proposed criterion, we can have
no scientific basis for Ethics; which leads to a brief discussion of
the nature of Science, and the applicability of its methods to Ethics.

(3) That the criterion of Good is current convention. To which it
is replied, that conventions are always changing, and that the moral
reformer is precisely the man who disputes those which are current.
Especially, it is urged that our own conventions are, in fact,
vigorously challenged, e.g. by Nietzsche.

(4) That the criterion of Good is Pleasure, or the "greatest happiness
of the greatest number." To which it is replied:

(a) That this view is not, as is commonly urged, in accordance with
'common sense.'

(b) That either Pleasure must be taken in the simplest and narrowest
sense; in which case it is palpably inadequate as a criterion of
Good; or its meaning must be so widely extended that the term Pleasure
becomes as indefinite as the term Good.

(c) That if the criterion of Pleasure were to be fairly applied, it
would lead to results that would shock those who profess to adopt it.

III. These methods of determining Good having been set