people, by the methods of discussion and persuasion and
the like. And all this, as I understand, is what Ellis was denying."
"Certainly," said Ellis, "I was; and I still do not see that you have
proved it."
"No," I said, "I have not even tried to. I have only tried to show
that in spite of your denial you really do believe it, because a
belief in it is implied in all your practical activity. And that, I
thought, you did admit yourself."
"But even so," he replied, "it remains to be considered whether my
theory is not more reasonable than my practice."
"Perhaps," I replied; "but that, I admit, is not the question that
really interests me. What I want to get at is the belief which
underlies the whole life of people like ourselves, and of which, it
seems, we cannot practically divest ourselves. And such a belief, I
think, is this which we have been discussing as to the validity of our
opinions about Good."
"I see," he said; "in fact you are concerning yourself not with
philosophy but with psychology."
"If you like; it matters little what you call it. Only, whatever it
be, you will do me a service if for the moment you will place yourself
at my standpoint, and see with me how things look from there."
"Very well," he said, "I have no objection, and so far, on the whole,
I do agree with you; though I am bound to point out that you might
easily find an opponent less complaisant. Your argument is very much
one _ad hominem_."
"It is," I said, "and that, I confess, is the only kind of argument in
which I much believe in these matters. I am content, for the present,
if you and the others here go along with me."
"I do," said Parry, "but you seem to me to be only stating, in an
unnecessarily elaborate way, what after all is a mere matter of common
sense."
"Perhaps it is," I replied, "though I have always thought myself
rather deficient in that kind of sense. But what does Leslie say?"
"Oh," he said, "I can't think how you can be content with anything so
lame and impotent! Some method there must be, absolute and _a priori_,
by which we may prove for certain that Good is, and discover, as well,
what things are good."
"Well," I said, "if there be such a method, you, if anyone, should
find it; and I wish you from my heart good luck in the quest. It is
only in default of anything better that I fall back on this--I dare
not call it method; this appeal to opinion and belief."
"And even so," said Ellis, "it is l
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