en it occurs; whereas
there is no such general recognition of Good."
"That," I admitted, "may, perhaps, be true; I am not sure."
"But," broke in Leslie, "what does it matter whether it be true or
no? What has all this to do with the question? It's immaterial whether
Pleasure or Good is the more easily and generally recognisable. The
point is that they are radically different things."
"No," objected Parry, "_our_ point is that they are the same thing."
"But I don't believe you really think so, or that anyone can."
"And _I_ don't believe that anyone _cannot_!"
"Do you mean to say that you really agree with Bentham that, quantity
of pleasure being equal, pushpin is as good as poetry?"
"Yes; at least I agree with what he means, though the particular
example doesn't appeal to me, for I hardly know what either pushpin or
poetry is."
"Well then, let us take Plato's example. Do you think that, quantity
of pleasure being equal, scratching oneself when one itches is as good
as, say, pursuing scientific research."
"Yes. But of course the point is that quantity of pleasure is not
equal."
"You mean," interposed Ellis, "that there is more pleasure in
scratching?"
"No, of course not."
"But at least you will admit that there is more pleasure in some
physical experiences? Plato, for example, takes the case of a
catamite."
"I admit nothing of the kind. In the first place, these gross physical
pleasures do not last."
"But suppose they did? Imagine an eternal, never-changing bliss of
scratching, or of--"
"I don't see the use of discussing the matter in this kind of way. It
seems to me to deserve serious treatment"
"But I am perfectly serious. I do genuinely believe that a heaven of
scratching, or at any rate of some analogous but intenser experience,
would involve an indefinitely greater sum of pleasure than a heaven of
scientific research."
"Well, all I can say is, I don't agree with you."
"But why not?" cried Leslie. "If you were candid I believe you would.
The fact is that you have predetermined that scientific research is a
better thing than such physical pleasure, and then you bring out your
calculation of pleasure so as to agree with that foregone conclusion.
And that is what the Utilitarians always do. Being ordinary decent
people they accept the same values as the rest of the world, and on
the same grounds as the rest of the world. And then they pretend,
and no doubt believe themselves, th
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