k, will feel that it is in conversation that they get
their best lights; and Dialogue is merely an attempt to reproduce in
literary form this natural genesis of opinion. Lastly, my own attitude
in approaching the issues with which I have dealt was, I found, so
little dogmatic, so sincerely speculative, that I should have felt
myself hampered by the form of a treatise. I was more desirous to
set forth various points of view than finally to repudiate or endorse
them; and though I have taken occasion to suggest certain opinions of
my own, I have endeavoured to do so in the way which should be least
imprisoning to my own thought, and least provocative of the reader's
antagonism. It has been my object, to borrow a phrase of Renan, 'de
presenter des series d'idees se developpant selon un ordre logique, et
non d'inculquer une opinion ou de precher un systeme determine.' And
I may add, with him, 'Moins que jamais je me sens l'audace de parler
doctrinalernent en pareille matiere.'
In conclusion, there is one defect which is, I think, inherent in the
Dialogue form, even if it were treated with far greater skill than any
to which I can pretend. The connection of the various phases of the
discussion can hardly be as clearly marked as it would be in a formal
treatise; and in the midst of digressions and interruptions, such
as are natural in conversation, the main thread of the reasoning may
sometimes be lost I have therefore appended a brief summary of the
argument, set forth in its logical connections.
ARGUMENT
BOOK I.
I. After a brief introduction, the discussion starts with a
consideration of the diversity of men's ideas about Good, a diversity
which suggests _prima facie_ a scepticism as to the truth of any of
these ideas.
The sceptical position is stated; and, in answer, an attempt is made
to show that the position is one which is not really accepted by
thinking men. For such men, it is maintained, regulate their lives by
their ideas about Good, and thus by implication admit their belief in
these ideas.
This is admitted; but the further objection is made, that for the
regulation of life it is only necessary for a man to admit a Good for
himself, without admitting also a General Good or Good of all. It is
suggested, in reply, that the conduct of thinking men commonly does
imply a belief in a General Good.
Against this it is urged that the belief implied is not in a Good
of all, but merely in the mutual c
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