festly
failed to bear in mind, that a right to petition implies the correlative
right to be heard. How different are the statesmen, who insist "on the
right to refuse to attend to a petition," from Him, who says, "Whoso
stoppeth his ears at the cry of the poor, he also shall cry himself, but
shall not be heard." And who are poor, if it be not those for whom the
abolitionists cry? They must even cry by proxy. For, in the language of
John Quincy Adams, the champion of the right of petition, "The slave is
not permitted to cry for mercy--to plead for pardon--to utter the shriek
of perishing nature for relief." It may be well to remark, that the
error, which I have pointed out in the Report in question, lies in the
premises of the principal argument of that paper; and that the
correction of this error is necessarily attended with the destruction of
the premises, and with the overthrow of the argument, which is built
upon them.

[Footnote A: Colonel Young.]

I surely need not stop to vindicate the right of petition. It is a
natural right--one that human laws can guarantee, but can neither create
nor destroy. It is an interesting fact, that the Amendment to the
Federal Constitution, which guarantees the right of petition, was
opposed in the Congress of 1789 as superfluous. It was argued, that this
is "a self-evident, inalienable right, which the people possess," and
that "it would never be called in question." What a change in
fifty years!

You deny the power of Congress to abolish the inter-state traffic in
human beings; and, inasmuch as you say, that the right "to regulate
commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states," does not
include the right to prohibit and destroy commerce; and, inasmuch as it
is understood, that it was in virtue of the right to regulate commerce,
that Congress enacted laws to restrain our participation in the "African
slave trade," you perhaps also deny, that Congress had the power to
enact such laws. The history of the times in which the Federal
Constitution was framed and adopted, justifies the belief, that the
clause of that instrument under consideration conveys the power, which
Congress exercised. For instance, Governor Randolph, when speaking in
the Virginia Convention of 1788, of the clause which declares, that "the
migration or importation of such persons as any of the states now
existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by
Congress prior to the year 1808,