ic sentiment--is it any less clear, that Congress has the power to
interdict the inter-state traffic in human beings?

There are some, who assert that the words "migration" and "importation,"
instead of referring, as I maintain they do--the former to the removal
of slaves from state to state, and the latter to their introduction from
Africa--are used in the Constitution as synonyms, and refer exclusively
to the "African slave trade." But there is surely no ground for the
imputation of such utter tautology, if we recollect that the
Constitution was written by scholars, and that remarkable pains were
taken to clear it of all superfluous words--a Committee having been
appointed for that special purpose. But, it may be asked, Why, in
reference to the taking of slaves from one state to another, use the
word "migration," which denotes voluntary removal? One answer is--that
it can be used with as much propriety in that case, as in the removal of
slaves from Africa--the removal in the one case being no less
involuntary than in the other. Another answer is--that the framers of
the Constitution selected the word "migration," because of its congruity
with that of "persons," under which their virtuous shame sought to
conceal from posterity the existence of seven hundred thousand slaves
amongst a people, who had but recently entered upon their national
career, with the solemn declaration, that "all men are created equal."

John Jay, whose great celebrity is partly owing to his very able
expositions of the Constitution, says: "To me, the constitutional
authority of the Congress to prohibit the migration _and_ importation of
slaves into any of the states, does not appear questionable." If the
disjunctive between "migration" and "importation" in the Constitution,
argues their reference to the same thing, Mr. Jay's copulative argues
more strongly, that, in his judgment, they refer to different things.

The law of Congress constituting the "Territory of Orleans," was enacted
in 1804. It fully recognizes the power of that body to prohibit the
trade in slaves between a territory and the states. But, if Congress had
this power, why had it not as clear a power to prohibit, at that time,
the trade in slaves between any two of the states? It might have
prohibited it, but for the constitutional suspension of the exercise of
the power. The term of that suspension closed, however, in 1808; and,
since that year, Congress has had as full power to