o its rule of impartial and universal liberty. Were it otherwise, the
principles of that instrument could be pleaded to justify the holding of
men as property, in cases, other than those specifically provided for in
it. Were it otherwise, these principles might be appealed to, as well to
sanction the enslavement of men, as the capture of wild beasts. Were it
otherwise, the American people might be Constitutionally realizing the
prophet's declaration: "they all lie in wait for blood: they hunt every
man his brother with a net." But mere principles, whether in or out of
the Constitution, do not avail to justify and uphold slavery. Says Lord
Mansfield in the famous Somerset case: "The state of slavery is of such
a nature, that it is incapable of being now introduced by courts of
justice upon mere reasoning or inferences from any principles, natural
or political; it must take its rise from _positive law_; the origin of
it can in no country or age be traced back to any other source. A case
so odious as the condition of slaves, must be taken strictly." Grotius
says, that "slavery places man in an unnatural relation to man--a
relation which nothing but positive law can sustain." All are aware,
that, by the common law, man cannot have property in man; and that
wherever that law is not counteracted on this point by positive law,
"slaves cannot breathe," and their "shackles fall." I scarcely need add,
that the Federal Constitution does, in the main, accord with the common
law. In the words of a very able writer: "The common law is the grand
element of the United States Constitution. All its fundamental
provisions are instinct with its spirit; and its existence, principles,
and paramount authority, are presupposed and assumed throughout
the whole."

To argue the anti-slavery character of the Federal Constitution, it is
not necessary to take the high ground of some, that whatever in the
Constitution favors slavery is void, because opposed to the principles
and general tenor of that instrument. Much less is it necessary to take
the still higher ground, that every law in favor of slavery, in whatever
code or connection it may be found, is utterly invalid because of its
plain contravention of the law of nature. To maintain my position, that
the Constitution is anti-slavery in its general character, and that
constitutional slavery is, at the most, but an exception to that general
character, it was not necessary to take either of these g