rt with cargo already on
board, or in ballast. Vessels cleared coastwise were to be deterred
from turning foreign by bonds exacted in double the value of ship and
cargo. American export and foreign navigation were thus completely
stopped; and as the Non-Importation Act at last went into operation on
December 14,[220] there was practical exclusion of all British
vessels, for none could be expected to enter a port where she could
neither land her cargo nor depart.
In communicating the embargo to Pinkney, for the information of the
British Government,[221] Madison was careful to explain, as he had to
the British minister at Washington, that it was a measure of
precaution only; not to be considered as hostile in character. This
was scarcely candid; coercion of Great Britain, to compel the
withdrawal of her various maritime measures objectionable to the
United States, was at least a silent partner in the scheme, as
formulated to the consciousness of Jefferson and his followers.[222]
The motive transpired, as such motives necessarily do; but, even had
it not, the operation of the Act, under the conditions of the European
war, was so plainly partial between the two belligerents, as to
amount virtually to co-operation with Napoleon by the preponderance of
injury done to Great Britain. It deprived her of cotton for raw
material; of tobacco, which, imported in payment for British
manufactures, formed a large element in her commerce with the
Continent; of wheat and flour, which to some extent contributed to the
support of her people, though in a much less degree than many
supposed. It closed to her the American market at the moment that
Napoleon and Alexander were actively closing the European; and it shut
off from the West Indies American supplies known to be of the greatest
importance, and fondly, but mistakenly, believed to be indispensable.
All this was well enough, if national policy required. Great Britain
then was scarcely in a position to object seriously to retaliation by
a nation thinking itself injured; but to define such a measure as not
hostile was an insult to her common-sense. It was certainly hostile in
nature, it was believed to be hostile in motive, and it intensified
feelings already none too friendly. In France, although included in
the embargo, and although her action was one of the reasons alleged
for its institution, Napoleon expressed approval. It was injurious to
England, and added little to the pressu
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