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o be reaped by British enterprise alone."[264] Upon the whole, through silent popular resistance, and the concurrence of the Spanish revolution, the United States by cutting its own throat underwent more distress than it inflicted upon the enemy. Besides the widespread individual suffering,[265] already mentioned, the national revenue, dependent almost wholly on customs, shrank with the imports. Despite the relief afforded by cargoes bound home when the embargo passed, and the permits issued to bring in American property abroad, the income from this source sank from over $16,000,000 to $8,400,000.[266] "However dissimilar in some respects," wrote Gallatin in a public report, "it is not believed that in their effect upon national wealth and public revenue war and embargo would be materially different. In case of war, some part of that revenue will remain; but if embargo and suspension of commerce continue, that which arises from commerce will entirely disappear."[267] Jefferson nevertheless clung to the system, even to the end of his life, with a conviction that defied demonstration. The fundamental error of conception, of course, was in considering embargo an efficient alternative for war. The difference between the two measures, regarded coercively, was that embargo inflicted upon his own people all the loss that war could, yet spared the opponent that which war might do to him. For the United States, war would have meant, and when it came did mean, embargo, and little more. To Great Britain it would have meant all that the American embargo could do, plus the additional effort, expense, and actual loss, attendant upon the increased exposure of her maritime commerce, and its protection against active and numerous foes, singularly well fitted for annoyance by their qualities and situation. War and embargo, combined, with Napoleon in the plenitude of his power, as he was in 1808, would sorely have tried the enemy; even when it came, amid the Emperor's falling fortunes, the strain was severe. But Jefferson's lack of appreciation for maritime matters, his dislike to the navy, and the weakness to which he had systematically reduced it, prevented his realizing the advantages of war over embargo, as a measure of coercion. To this contributed also his conviction of the exposure of Canada to offensive operations, which was just, though fatally vitiated by an unfounded confidence in untrained troops, or militia summoned from th
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