o be reaped by
British enterprise alone."[264]
Upon the whole, through silent popular resistance, and the concurrence
of the Spanish revolution, the United States by cutting its own throat
underwent more distress than it inflicted upon the enemy. Besides the
widespread individual suffering,[265] already mentioned, the national
revenue, dependent almost wholly on customs, shrank with the imports.
Despite the relief afforded by cargoes bound home when the embargo
passed, and the permits issued to bring in American property abroad,
the income from this source sank from over $16,000,000 to
$8,400,000.[266] "However dissimilar in some respects," wrote Gallatin
in a public report, "it is not believed that in their effect upon
national wealth and public revenue war and embargo would be materially
different. In case of war, some part of that revenue will remain; but
if embargo and suspension of commerce continue, that which arises from
commerce will entirely disappear."[267] Jefferson nevertheless clung
to the system, even to the end of his life, with a conviction that
defied demonstration. The fundamental error of conception, of course,
was in considering embargo an efficient alternative for war. The
difference between the two measures, regarded coercively, was that
embargo inflicted upon his own people all the loss that war could, yet
spared the opponent that which war might do to him. For the United
States, war would have meant, and when it came did mean, embargo, and
little more. To Great Britain it would have meant all that the
American embargo could do, plus the additional effort, expense, and
actual loss, attendant upon the increased exposure of her maritime
commerce, and its protection against active and numerous foes,
singularly well fitted for annoyance by their qualities and situation.
War and embargo, combined, with Napoleon in the plenitude of his
power, as he was in 1808, would sorely have tried the enemy; even when
it came, amid the Emperor's falling fortunes, the strain was severe.
But Jefferson's lack of appreciation for maritime matters, his dislike
to the navy, and the weakness to which he had systematically reduced
it, prevented his realizing the advantages of war over embargo, as a
measure of coercion. To this contributed also his conviction of the
exposure of Canada to offensive operations, which was just, though
fatally vitiated by an unfounded confidence in untrained troops, or
militia summoned from th
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