re upon France exerted by the
Orders in Council through the British control of the ocean. Senator
Smith of Maryland, a large shipping merchant, bore testimony to this.
"It has been truly said by an eminent merchant of Salem, that not more
than one vessel in eight that sailed for Europe within a short time
before the embargo reached its destination. My own experience has
taught me the truth of this; and as further proof I have in my hand a
list of fifteen vessels which sailed for Europe between September 1
and December 23, 1807. Three arrived; two were captured by French and
Spaniards; one was seized in Hamburg; and nine carried into England.
But for the embargo, ships that would have sailed would have fared as
ill, or worse. Not one in twenty would have arrived." Granting the
truth of this anticipation, Great Britain might have claimed that, so
far as evident danger was concerned, her blockades over long
coast-lines were effective.

The question speedily arose,--If the object of embargo be precaution
only, to save our vessels from condemnation under the sweeping edicts
of France and Great Britain, and seamen from impressment on American
decks, why object to exporting native produce in foreign bottoms, and
to commerce across the Canada frontier? If, by keeping our vessels at
home, we are to lose the profits upon sixty million dollars' worth of
colonial produce which they have heretofore been carrying, with
advantage to the national revenue, why also forbid the export of the
forty to fifty million dollars' worth of domestic produce which
foreign ship-owners would gladly take and safely carry? for such
foreigners would be chiefly British, and would sail under British
convoy, subject to small proportionate risk.[223] Why, also, to save
seamen from impressment, deprive them of their living, and force them
in search of occupation to fly our ports to British, where lower wages
and more exposure to the pressgang await them? On the ground of
precaution, there was no reply to these questions; unless, perhaps,
that with open export of domestic produce the popular suffering would
be too unequally distributed, falling almost wholly on New England
shipping industries. Logically, however, if the precaution were
necessary, the suffering must be accepted; its incidence was a detail
only. The embargo was distinctly a hostile measure; and more and more,
as people talked, in and out of Congress, was admitted to be simply
an alternative fo