gest the possibility, if not of acquiescence in the Orders in
Council, at least of such abstention from active resentment as would
have been practically equivalent.
The acquiescence, if possible even the co-operation, of America was at
this time momentous to Great Britain as well as to Napoleon. To
complete his scheme for ruining his enemy, by closing against her
commerce all the ports of Europe, the Emperor needed to deprive her
also of access to the markets of the United States; while the grave
loss to which Great Britain was exposed in the one quarter made it
especially necessary to retain the large and increasing body of
consumers across the Atlantic. In the United States there was a
division of public opinion and feeling, which offered a fair chance of
inclining national action in one direction or the other. Although the
Treaty of Commerce and Navigation of December 31, 1806, had been
rejected by the Administration, and disapproved by the stricter
followers of Jefferson and Madison, it was regarded with favor in many
quarters. Its negotiators had represented the two leading parties
which divided the nation. Monroe was a republican, traditionally
allied to Jefferson; Pinkney was a federalist. Although in it the
principles of the United States had not been successfully asserted, as
regarded either impressment or the transport of colonial produce, the
terms of compromise had commanded their signatures, because they held
that in effect the national objects were obtained; that impressment
would practically cease, and the carrying trade, under the
restrictions they had accepted, would not only nourish, but be as
remunerative as before. Monroe, who had a large personal following in
his state and party, maintained this view in strong and measured
language after his return home; and it found supporters in both
political camps, as well as upon the floor of the two houses of
Congress. Then, and afterwards, it was made a reproach to the
Administration that it had refused a working arrangement which was
satisfactory in its substantial results and left the principles of the
country untouched for future assertion. Whatever may be thought, from
an American standpoint, of the justice or dignity of this position, it
showed grave divergences of sentiment, from which it is the skill of
an opposing diplomatist to draw profit. It is impossible to estimate
the effect upon the subsequent course of America, if the British
ministry, with
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