hipwrecked failed, if his property
had been bought in England. Recognition of the increased danger was
shown in the doubling and trebling of insurance. The geographical
sweep intended to be given to the edict was manifested by the action
of state after state whither arms had extended Napoleon's influence;
or, as Armstrong phrased it, "having settled the business of
belligerents, with the exception of England, very much to his own
liking, he was now on the point of settling that of neutrals in the
same way." In July, Denmark and Portugal, as yet at peace, had been
notified that they must choose between France and England, and had
been compelled to exclude English commerce. August 29, a French
division entered Leghorn, belonging to the nominally independent
Kingdom of Etruria, took possession of the harbor and forts, ordered
the surrender of all British goods in the hands of the inhabitants,
and laid a general embargo upon the shipping, among which were many
Americans. In Lower Italy, the Papal States and Naples underwent the
same restrictions. Prussia yielded under obvious constraint, and
Austria acceded from motives of policy, distinguishable in form only
from direct compulsion. Russia, as already said, had joined
immediately after decisive defeat in the field. The co-operation of
the United States, the second maritime nation in the world, was vital
to the general plan. Could it be secured? Already, at an audience
given to the diplomatic corps on August 2, the Danish minister had
taken Armstrong aside and asked him whether any application had been
made to him with regard to the projected _union of all commercial
states against Great Britain_. Being answered in the negative, he
said, "You are much favored, but it will not last."[205] Armstrong
characterized this incident as not important; but in truth the words
italicized defined exactly the menacing scheme already matured in the
Emperor's mind, for the execution of which, as events already showed,
and continued to prove, he relied upon the force of arms. To this the
United States was not accessible; but to coerce or cajole her by other
means became a prominent feature of French policy, which was
powerfully abetted by the tone of Great Britain speaking through
Canning.

To appreciate duly the impending measures of the British ministry,
attention should fasten upon the single decisive fact that this vast
combination was not the free act of the parties concerned, but a
s