he southward. Ruyter followed them, and on the early
morning of June 7, 1672, the Dutch fleet was signalled by a French
lookout frigate in the northward and eastward; standing down before a
northeast wind for the allied fleet, from which a large number of
boats and men were ashore in watering parties. The Dutch order of
battle was in two lines, the advanced one containing eighteen ships
with fire-ships (Plate III., A). Their total force was ninety-one
ships-of-the-line; that of the allies one hundred and one.

The wind was blowing toward the coast, which here trends nearly north
and south, and the allies were in an awkward position. They had first
to get under way, and they could not fall back to gain time or room to
establish their order. Most of the ships cut their cables, and the
English made sail on the starboard tack, heading about north-northwest,
a course which forced them soon to go about; whereas the French took
the other tack (Plate III., B). The battle began therefore by the
separation of the allied fleet. Ruyter sent one division to attack the
French, or rather to contain them; for these opponents exchanged only a
distant cannonade, although the Dutch, being to windward, had the
choice of closer action if they wished it. As their commander, Bankert,
was not censured, it may be supposed he acted under orders; and he was
certainly in command a year later, and acting with great judgment and
gallantry at the battle of the Texel. Meanwhile Ruyter fell furiously
upon the two English divisions, and apparently with superior forces;
for the English naval historians claim that the Dutch were in the
proportion of three to two.[47] If this can be accepted, it gives a
marked evidence of Ruyter's high qualities as a general officer, in
advance of any other who appears in this century.

[Illustration: Pl. III.]

The results of the battle, considered simply as an engagement, were
indecisive; both sides lost heavily, but the honors and the substantial
advantages all belonged to the Dutch, or rather to De Ruyter. He had
outgeneralled the allies by his apparent retreat, and then returning
had surprised them wholly unprepared. The false move by which the
English, two thirds of the whole, stood to the northward and westward,
while the other third, the French, went off to the east and south,
separated the allied fleet; Ruyter threw his whole force into the gap,
showing front to the French with a division probably smaller in