ng in not relying upon the sincerity of the
English alliance, when he was receiving from all quarters warnings
that the people and the nobles were murmuring against it, and Charles
II. was perhaps alone in his kingdom in wishing it?"[54] Possibly not;
but he was surely wrong if he wished any military man, or body of men,
to play the equivocal part assigned to the French admiral on this day;
the loss of the fleet would have been a lighter disaster. So evident
to eye-witnesses was the bad faith or cowardice (and the latter
supposition is not admissible), that one of the Dutch seamen, as they
discussed among themselves why the French did not come down, said:
"You fools! they have hired the English to fight for them, and all
their business here is to see that they earn their wages." A more
sober-minded and significant utterance is that with which the
intendant at Brest ends the official report before mentioned: "It
would appear in all these sea-fights Ruyter has never cared to attack
the French squadron, and that in this last action he had detached ten
ships of the Zealand squadron to keep it in play."[55] No stronger
testimony is needed to Ruyter's opinion of the inefficiency or
faithlessness of that contingent to the allied forces.

Another chapter in the history of maritime coalitions was closed, on
the 21st of August, 1673, by the battle of the Texel. In it, as in
others, were amply justified the words with which a modern French
naval officer has stamped them: "United by momentary political
interests, but at bottom divided to the verge of hatred, never
following the same path in counsel or in action, they have never
produced good results, or at least results proportioned to the efforts
of the powers allied against a common enemy. The navies of France,
Spain, and Holland seem, at several distinct times, to have joined
only to make more complete the triumph of the British arms."[56] When
to this well-ascertained tendency of coalitions is added the equally
well known jealousy of every country over the increasing power of a
neighbor, and the consequent unwillingness to see such increase
obtained by crushing another member of the family of nations, an
approach is made to the measure of naval strength required by a State.
It is not necessary to be able to meet all others combined, as some
Englishmen have seemed to think; it is necessary only to be able to
meet the strongest on favorable terms, sure that the others will not
j